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UNIVERSITY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CODES
v. FREE SPEECH
LAURI A. EBEL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of hate speech includes issues ranging from criminal statutes
prohibiting it' to the possibility of tort liability. 2 This article, however,
will deal only with the constitutionality of university anti-discrimination
codes that restrict hate speech and impose sanctions against those who
use "forbidden words." Colleges and universities all over the United
States have enacted or are considering enacting anti-discrimination codes
restricting hate speech. 3 The purpose of this article is to discuss the
constitutionality of these codes and not the legitimacy of the disciplinary
measures violators face as a result of these implementations. Accordingly,
the various sanctions imposed against students found to be in violation
of the codes will not be discussed in detail.'
These university codes seem to have brought the subject of hate speech
to public attention and legal debate faster than any other restriction on
hate speech. Perhaps this is because of the incidents which have prompted
university administrations to create them.' Perhaps it is because of the

* Lauri A. Ebel, J.D., 1992, Marquette University, is currently a Special Prosecutor with the
Racine County District Attorney's Office in Racine, Wisconsin.
The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Professor Christine M. Wiseman for her support
and encouragement. She also extends her gratitude to the Marquette University Law School library
staff, especially Mary Mahoney, Duane Strojny, and Robin Cork for their assistance with the
researching of this article, and to Steve Nelson for his computer troubleshooting.
1. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2346 n.138 (1987).
2. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and NameCalling, 17 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
3. The following are a few examples of such schools: Brown University, Emory University,
Princeton University, Stanford University, Tufts University, the University of California System,
the University of Connecticut, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Michigan,
the University of Nebraska, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of
Oklahoma, the University of Texas, the University of Vermont, and the University of Wisconsin
System. See Evan G.S. Siegel, Note, Closing The Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation
of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1375 n.137 (1990).
4. Usually sanctions are imposed through campus administrative hearings, and the types of
sanctions range from letters of apology to expulsion. See Douglas Hann, Student at Brown University
is Expelled Under a Rule Barring "Hate Speech," N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1991, at A17, col. I
("Brown University has expelled a student for shouting racial epithets, thereby violating an antiharassment rule enacted in 1989 as part of an effort by the university to combat racism on campus.
It is the first time a Brown student has been expelled for such a violation and is thought to be
the first such expulsion in the country.").
5. See Pete Hamill, Black & White at Brown, EsQuiRE, Apr. 1990, at 67 ("Last year, the
Justice Department reported racial incidents on seventy-seven campuses, from state universities to
the most elite academies, ranging from jokes to full-scale brawls. This was an increase of almost
50 percent over the year before .. ");Abraham H. Foxman, Anti-Semitic Incidents in 1988 Put

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 23

values which institutions of higher learning are thought to hold. 6 Whatever

the reason, the community at large, which often reflects university controversies, will also have to deal with this issue at some point.7

Part II of this article presents a brief history of permissible and nonpermissible restrictions of speech in schools and a few examples of some
of the more prominent anti-discrimination codes that have been implemented. Part III discusses the concept that hate speech can be adequately
restricted under existing constitutional doctrines. Part IV examines the
civil libertarian's view that hate speech cannot be restricted because it

is protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Part V considers the rights of the victims of hate speech
and Mari Matsuda's theory that universities are a special case where
broader restrictions on speech are not only permissible, but necessary to
protect the rights of minorities. 8 Part VI concludes by suggesting that
both freedom of speech rights and victims' rights must be balanced when
attempting to deal with hate speech. This balancing includes allowing
anti-discrimination codes to limit speech under an existing constitutional
doctrine to protect victims, while at the same time encouraging cultural
awareness to create long term attitude changes towards minority groups.
II.

HISTORY

A.

Past Restrictions on Student Speech
Most case law dealing with restrictions on student speech involves high
school students. Two cases in 19669 involved the right of students to

at 5 Year High, N.Y. Tamrs, Jan. 29, 1989, at 20, col. I ("A sharp increase is also reported in
the number of college campuses that experienced anti-Jewish incidents. In 1988, 38 campuses reported
such incidents, up from 14 in 1987 .... "); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2331-32 ("Our college
campuses have seen an epidemic of racist incidents in the 1980's."); Constance C.R. White, The
New Racists, Ms., Oct. 1987, at 68 (reporting racist incidents at the University of Michigan, the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Wisconsin, the University of New Mexico,
Columbia University, Wellesley College, Duke University, and UCLA). For specific incidents, see
Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431, 433 (at the University of Michigan a student walked into class and saw the following
written on the blackboard: "A mind is a terrible thing to waste-especially on a n-r."); id. at 433
(at Purdue University a counselor found "Death N-r" scratched on her door); id. at 448 (at the
University of Wisconsin at Madison "white male students trailed black female students shouting,
'I've never tried a n-r before."'); Art Levine, America's Youthful Bigots, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, May 7, 1990, at 59 ("At the University of Arizona, gunshot blasts shattered the windows
of the Jewish students' building."); id. (at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, students
shouted "Hitler had the right idea" and other anti-Semitic vulgarities outside a Jewish fraternity);
NEw MExIco DAILY LoBo, Oct. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (at a fraternity party a poem entitled "The
Seven Wisemen Who Created the Perfect P--y" was read to a roomful of men who were told to
stand up for the reading, while the women were told to sit down because "you are not going to
like this"). This article does not spell out racial slurs or other profanity in order to avoid harm
to others, and to prevent desensitization to harmful words.
6. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2371.
7. Id. at 2370.
8. For purposes of this article, the word "minority" signifies individuals and groups who
historically have been the targets of discrimination or harassment solely because of race, ethnicity,
gender, religion, or sexual orientation.
9. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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wear politically oriented buttons.10 The 1969 case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District" upheld the right of students
to wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. The 1985 case
of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 2 upheld the restriction on
a sexually explicit speech given by a student on the grounds that it was
lewd, indecent, or offensive.
None of these cases, however, dealt with hate speech, and none were
in the university setting. Therefore, the courts could choose not to use
these decisions as precedent when they are faced with litigation challenging
university anti-discrimination codes. The reasons for this are twofold.
First, courts have held that there is a difference between the rights of
minors and those of adults. 3 This had allowed the courts to place
restrictions on minors' rights which would be unconstitutional if applied
to adults.' 4 Second, none of the previous high school cases concern hate
speech, where there are victims. Instead, the speech at issue was either
political or sexually explicit. It is very likely that, considering these two
differences, courts would distinguish these cases.
B. Recent Anti-Discrimination Codes Implemented by Colleges and
Universities
Although colleges and universities all over the United States have
implemented or are considering implementing anti-discrimination codes 5
a few of these codes will be discussed
to combat hate speech, only
6
specifically in this article.'
One of the first universities to create and enforce a code prohibiting
hate speech was the University of Connecticut. Its code was also one of
the first challenged legally. The code prohibited "posting or advertising
publicly offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning persons ...
and making personal slurs or epithets based on race, sex, ethnic origin,
disability, religion or sexual orientation."' 7 In 1989, the University of
Connecticut found Nina Wu, a sophomore, guilty of violating its student

10. In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit ordered that high school authorities be enjoined from enforcing
a regulation forbidding students to wear "freedom buttons." See generally Burnside, 363 F.2d 744.
In Blackwell, the same court on the same day reached the opposite result on different facts. It
declined to enjoin enforcement of such a regulation in another high school where the students
wearing freedom buttons harassed students who did not wear them and created much disturbance.
See generally Blackwell, 363 F.2d 749.
11.393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
13. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (holding that the
state has a broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults).
14. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (restricting a minor's access to adult magazines);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding censorship of a high school
newspaper).
15. Although all schools do not refer to their restrictions on hate speech using the term "antidiscrimination code," that is the phrase this article will use to refer to all university policies that
restrict hate speech.
16. Codes that will be discussed are those from Stanford University, the University of Connecticut,
the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin.
17. Jerry Adler et al., Taking Offense, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48.
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behavior code. Ms. Wu allegedly posted a sign on the outside of her
dormitory door which "listed the types of people who were 'welcome,'
'tolerated,' 'unwelcome' and 'shot on sight.' The last category included
'bimbos,' 'preppies,' 'racists' and, some students say, 'homos."" ' Ms.
Wu denied using the offensive term at the administrative hearing, but
the school ruled against her, and she was ordered to move off campus
and stay out of the dorms and cafeterias.' 9 Ms. Wu filed suit against
the school and asked the court to assume, for purposes of the lawsuit,
that she had used the offensive term. 20 Under pressure from the federal
lawsuit, the school let her move back onto campus in 1990.21 In response
to the legal action taken against it, the university is changing its code
to prohibit speech only in a confrontation that is "inherently likely to
provoke an imminent violent reaction." 22
In John Doe v. University of Michigan,23 a 1988 anti-discrimination
policy enacted by the school, entitled The University of Michigan Policy
on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment ("Policy"), was at
issue. 24 The Policy applied to educational and academic buildings-class25
rooms, libraries, research laboratories, recreation centers, and study areas.
When the university withdrew section l(c) in August of 1989 because
"a need exists for further explanation and clarification of [that section]
of the policy," 26 section 2(c) was retained, without explanation as to the

18.
col. 2.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Nick Ravo, Campus Slur Alters a Code Against Bias, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 11, 1989, at BI,

Adler et al., supra note 17.
Ravo, supra note 18.
Adler et al., supra note 17.
How to Handle Hate on Campus, N.Y. Tissis, Dec. 13, 1989, at A30, col. 1.
721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Pursuant to the Policy, persons were subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal
safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's
academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that
stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual orientation
where such behavior:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal
safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's
academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
Id. at 856.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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difference between the two sections. In 1988, the University Office of

Affirmative Action issued an interpretive guide ("Guide") entitled What
Students' Should Know about Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the University Environment.27 The Guide purported to be an interpretation of the Policy and provided examples of

prohibited conduct.2 The university withdrew the Guide in 1989 because
"the information in it was not accurate." ' 29 These two incidents demonstrate the nature of the problem universities face regarding interpretation
and understanding of their anti-discrimination codes.
A psychology graduate student specializing in bio-psychology brought
suit against the University of Michigan challenging the Policy.30 The
student, referred to as John Doe in the case, 3 "said that certain controversial theories positing biologically-based differences between sexes
and races might be perceived as 'sexist' and 'racist' by some and might
be sanctionable under the Policy." 3 2 The court found that Doe had
standing to sue even though no action had been taken against him because
"Itlhe record clearly shows that there existed a realistic and credible
threat that Doe could be sanctioned were he to discuss certain biopsychological theories." 33 The court ruled for Doe, finding the Policy
overbroad and vague.3 4 The court believed the Policy was overbroad
because of several complaints that led to investigations and/or hearings
against students regarding statements they made in the classroom setting
and/or during academic discussions and research.35 They believed the
27. Id. at 857.
28. Id. at 857-58.
29. Id. at 858.
30. Id. at 852.
31. "Plaintiff proceeded under the pseudonym 'John Doe' to preserve his privacy and protect
himself from any adverse publicity arising from this case. The University did not contest plaintiff's
right to proceed anonymously." Id. at 854 n.l.
32. Id. at 858.
33. Id. at 859-60.
34. Id.at 861-67.
35. On December 7, 1988, a complaint was filed against a graduate student in the
School of Social Work alleging that he had harassed students based on sexual
orientation and sex. The basis for the sexual orientation charge was apparently that
in a research class, the student openly stated his belief that homosexuality was a
disease and that he intended to develop a counseling plan for changing gay clients
to straight .... He also related to other students he had been counseling several
of his gay patients accordingly. The student apparently had several heated discussions
with his classmates over the validity and morality of his theory and program. On
January 11, 1989 the Interim Policy Administrator wrote to the student informing
him that following an investigation of the complaints, there was sufficient evidence
to warrant a formal hearing on the charges of sex and sexual orientation harassment.
A formal hearing on the charges was held on January 28, 1989. The hearing panel
unanimously found that the student was guilty of sexual harassment but refused
to convict him of harassment on the basis of sexual orientation .. . . Although
the student was not sanctioned over the allegations of sexual orientation harassment,
the fact remains that the Policy Administrator-the authoritative voice of the
University on these matters-saw no First Amendment problem in forcing the student
to a hearing to answer for allegedly harassing statements made in the course of
academic discussion and research. Moreover, there is no indication that had the
hearing panel convicted rather than acquitted the student, the University would
have interceded to protect the interests of academic freedom and freedom of speech.
Id. at 865.
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policy was vague because, "[looking at the plain language of the Policy,
it was simply impossible to discern any limitation on its scope or any
conceptual distinction between protected and unprotected conduct.''36
In June of 1990, Stanford University likewise implemented an antidiscrimination policy. 3 7 Because Stanford is a private institution, its antidiscrimination policy is insulated from the type of legal action taken by
Doe against the University of Michigan.18 However:
[tihe Stanford code is unique in that it complies with constitutional
requirements that dictate the extent to which a public university may
regulate speech. The university's administration recognizes that 'it is
not bound by the First Amendment, and can regulate or curtail the
expression of thought to a greater extent than a government-or state
university-may.' Despite its immunity from the constitution in this
regard, the university has unequivocally dedicated itself to enforcing
its policies in a manner consistent with modern first amendment law.3 9
Since the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to the policies of
private universities, students at these institutions have no basis to assert
a violation of their First Amendment rights. 40 Consequently, it is crucial
that private universities be even more responsible and more diligent when

36. Id. at 867.
37. Stanford's policy read as follows:
Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment
I. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry and free expression.
Students have the right to hold and vigorously defend and promote their opinions,
thus entering them into the life of the University, there to flourish or wither
according to their merits. Respect for this right requires that students tolerate even
expression of opinions which they find abhorrent. Intimidation of students by other
students in their exercise of this right, by violence or threat of violence, is therefore
considered to be a violation of the Fundamental Standard.
2. Stanford is committed to principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination.
Each student has the right to equal access to a Stanford education, without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation,
or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of students on the basis of any of these
characteristics contributes to a hostile environment and makes access to education
for those subjected to it less than equal. Such discriminatory harassment is therefore
considered to be a violation of the Fundamental Standard.
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended to clarify the point
at which protected free expression ends and prohibitive discriminatory harassment
begins. Prohibitive harassment includes discriminatory intimidation by threats of
violence, and also includes personal vilification of students on the basis of their
sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of individuals
on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes;
and
c) makes use of insulting or 'fighting' words or non-verbal symbols.
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 450-51.
38. Siegel, supra note 3, at 1381.
39. Id. at 1391 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 1381.
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creating anti-discrimination codes, in order to prevent violating their
students' First Amendment rights.
In UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System ,4 a newly implemented hate speech code was again at issue. In
1989, the University of Wisconsin system implemented an anti-discrimination policy into its Student Disciplinary Procedures. 42 In March of
1990, a lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin against the Regents of the University of
Wisconsin system. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
and oral arguments on the motions were heard in July, 1991. On October
4 3
11, 1991, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The court found that the policy was overbroad, ambiguous, and did
not meet the requirements of the fighting words doctrine. 4 Furthermore,
the court would not apply the limiting construction which had been urged
by the defendants.45

41. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
42. Wisconsin's policy read as follows:
UWS 17.06 OFFENSES DEFINED. The university may discipline a student in nonacademic matters in the following situations.
(1) For intentional conduct which constitutes a serious danger to the personal
safety of other members of the university community or guests. In order to illustrate
the types of conduct which this paragraph is designed to cover, the following
examples are set forth. These examples are not meant to illustrate the only situations
or types of conduct intended to be covered.
(a) A student would be in violation if he/she attacked or otherwise physically
abused, threatened to physically injure, or intimidate a member of the university
community or a guest because of that person's race, sex, religion, color, creed,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age.
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior,
uttered to an individual or on separate occasions to different individuals or for
physical conduct, if such comments, epithets, other expressive behavior or physical
conduct:
I. intentionally demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals, and
2. create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university
related work, or other university-authorized activity.
(b) In order to illustrate the types of conduct which this section is designed to
cover, the following examples are set forth. These examples are not meant to
illustrate the only situations or types of conduct intended to be covered.
1. A student would be in violation if he/she intentionally made demeaning remarks
to an individual based on that person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial slurs,
or 'jokes' that resulted in the creation of a hostile environment for eduction.
2. A student would be in violation if he/she intentionally placed visual or written
materials demeaning the race or sex of an individual in that person's university
living quarters or work area, resulting in the creation of a hostile environment for
education.
3. A student would be in violation if he/she seriously damaged or destroyed private
property of any member of the university community or guest because of that
person's race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, ancestry or age.
University of Wisconsin System 17, STUDENT DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, Feb. 1989 (Final
Draft).
43. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1163.
44. Id. at 1172-73.
45. Id. at 1163.
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The court held that the policy was overbroad because it covered a
substantial number of situations where no breach of the peace was likely
to occur.46 In addition, the court found the policy ambiguous because

it did not make clear whether the speaker must actually create a hostile
educational environment or if he or she must merely intend to do so. 47
Next, the court held that the policy did not meet the requirements of
the fighting words doctrine set out by the United States Supreme Court
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.48 In Chaplinsky, the Court developed
a two-part definition for fighting words: 1) "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury" and 2) words which "tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace." 49 According to the court in UWM Post:
Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has narrowed and clarified
the scope of the fighting words doctrine in at least three ways. First,
the Court has limited the fighting words definition so that it now
only includes its second half. Second, the Court has stated that in
order for words to meet the second half of the definition they must
"naturally tend to provoke violent resentment." Finally, the Court
has held that fighting words must be "directed at the person of the
hearer." 0
Therefore, the UWM Post court concluded that "[s]ince the elements of
the UW Rule do not require that the regulated speech, by its very
utterance, tend to incite violent reaction, the rule goes beyond the present
scope of the fighting words doctrine."'" Finally, the court refused to
adopt the limiting construction because the "construction fails to solve
the UW Rule's overbreadth difficulties. The Board's construction does
not prevent the Rule from reaching a substantial
amount of speech outside
'5 2
the traditional definition of fighting words."
III.

PROHIBITION OF HATE SPEECH UNDER EXISTING
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES

A.

The "Fighting Words" Doctrine
Several of the anti-discrimination codes previously discussed are based
on the "fighting words" doctrine which originated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.3 In Chaplinsky, the Court held that the fighting words
doctrine included those words which "inflict injury. ' 5 4 Due to the nar-

46. Id. at 1173.
47. Id. at 1179.
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. Id. at 572.
50. UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 1172.
52. Id. at 1178.
53. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that "[tihe English language has a number of words and
expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile,"
and "[s]uch words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight."). Id.
54. Id. at 572.
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rowing of this doctrine that has occurred over the years,55 now only

forms of hate speech that are likely to cause people to come to blows

can be limited under Chaplinsky5 6

B.

The Lewd, Indecent, or Offensive Speech Doctrine

Another argument for limiting hate speech comes from the "lewd,
indecent, or offensive" doctrine of Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser." In this case, the Supreme Court held that "schools, as instruments

of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent,
or offensive speech . . . . I Although this case concerned a sexually
explicit speech made to a group of high school students by another high
school student, a court could conceivably extend lewd, indecent, and
offensive speech to include hate speech. As mentioned earlier, however,
courts could choose not to use cases dealing with high school students
and speech issues as precedents for deciding cases involving university
students and hate speech.5 9
C. The Equal Educational Opportunity Doctrine
A third doctrine under which hate speech might well be regulated comes
from the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 60 In that
case, the Supreme Court recognized that African-American students did
not have an equal opportunity to learn or participate in the school
community when they were subjected to the message of humiliation and
psychic assault that segregation sends. 6' The Court held that "[tlo separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be

undone."

62 The

Court went on to quote a federal district court in Kansas:

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater

55. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
56. When the specific incidents discussed previously in supra note 5 are analyzed under this
doctrine, it is evident that some could be restricted while others could not. The writing on the
blackboard at the University of Michigan and the slurs shouted outside the Jewish fraternity at the
University of Illinois were not directed at an individual; therefore, they probably do not fall under
this doctrine. The incidents that might be legally restricted include the act against the Purdue
counselor and the harassment of the African-American females at the University of Wisconsin.
Although these acts were both directed at a particular individual it could be argued that a court
would have to find the speech was likely to cause a fight. The problem this creates is that even
if the counselor at Purdue did have a violent reaction to the hate message left on her door, it
could not cause a fight because the speaker was not present. Furthermore, with regard to the
comments made to the women at the University of Wisconsin, a court could find that this speech
was not likely to provoke a fight.
57. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
58. Id. at 683.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
61. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 464-65.
62. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to [retard) the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the63 benefits they would receive in
a racially] integrated school system.
It has been argued that university students are in a similar situation
and carry a similar burden when they are forced to live and work in
an environment where, at any time, they may be faced with denigrating
verbal harassment and/or assault. 64 It could be argued, therefore, that
hate speech may be regulated in order to provide an equal educational
opportunity to all students. The difference between segregation and hate
speech, however, is that the former is an act of the government while
the latter is usually an act of an individual. Brown prohibited government
speech, in that case segregation, from interfering with an equal educational
opportunity. Unless an anti-discrimination code is aimed only at preventing
hate speech by university faculty and staff, it probably would not be
held constitutional under Brown. This line of reasoning, separating govspeech from individual speech, was used by the court in UWM
ernment
Post.61 At least one court, therefore, has held that Brown does not allow
for the regulation of hate speech on university campuses.
D. The Group Defamation Theory
Another argument which has been advanced is that hate speech is
restricted under group defamation laws. Professor Charles Lawrence of
Stanford University argues that Brown v. Board of Education66 remains
an instructive case regarding group defamation, despite the implicit overruling of group defamation cases such as Beauharnais v. Illinois67 by
New York Times v. Sullivan6 and its progeny. 69 According to Professor
Lawrence:
Brown is a case about group defamation. The message of segregation
was stigmatizing to black children. To be labeled unfit to attend
school with white children injured the reputation of black children,
thereby foreclosing employment opportunities and the right to be
regarded as respected members of the body politic .... By identifying

the inseparability of discriminatory speech and action in the case of
segregation, whether injury is inflicted by the meaning of the message,

63. Id. It is interesting to note that while the lower Kansas courts recognized the damage done
to African-American students and the infringement on their right to an equal education, they still
ruled against them and upheld the laws permitting segregation. Id.
64. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 465.
65. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
67. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
68. 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964).
69. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 464.
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Brown limits the scope of Sullivan. Brown reflects that racism is a
form of 70subordination that achieves its purpose through group defamation.
The problem with the argument that hate speech is already regulable
under any or all of the above-mentioned cases-thus eliminating the need
for university anti-discrimination codes-is enforcement of the principles
advanced by these cases. Even if students knew their rights under these
cases, where and to whom would they go for support and help in exercising
their rights? It only makes sense that they would turn to university
administrators. Furthermore, it is appropriate that administrators be prepared with reporting procedures and policies that call for investigations,7
charges, hearings, and sanctions when a legitimate complaint is made. '
The dilemma that has arisen for university administrators is that of
forming an anti-discrimination code that protects the rights of victims
while at the same time not infringing on others' First Amendment speech
rights.
IV.

CIVIL LIBERTARIAN VIEWS ON THE REGULATION OF
HATE SPEECH

Civil libertarian views on hate speech have been most comprehensively
treated by Professor Nadine Strossen. 72 Although she includes several
arguments against regulating hate speech, not all of them will be discussed
in this article.
Regulation Under Existing Constitutional Doctrines
One of the first arguments Professor Strossen makes is that some
forms of campus hate speech may be regulable if narrowly drawn and
narrowly applied under the current constitutional doctrines previously
discussed in section 111. 71 She also states, however, that "the Supreme
Court has recognized that each of these doctrines may well be inconsistent
with free speech principles. Therefore, these doctrines may not support
any campus hate speech restrictions whatsoever. ' 74
A.

1. The "Fighting Words" Doctrine
Professor Strossen begins her argument by stating that basing university
anti-discrimination codes on the fighting words doctrine from Chaplinsky
75 may not be wise because "it has been substantially
v. New Hampshire
limited in scope and may no longer be good law." '76 She goes on to

70.
71.
72.
484.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 463-64 (footnote omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 15-50.
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J.
See generally id.
Id. at 507-08.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Strossen, supra note 72, at 508.
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argue that "even if the Supreme Court were to apply a narrowed version
of the doctrine, such an application would threaten free speech principles .

. ..

2. The Lewd, Indecent, or Offensive Speech Doctrine
Although Professor Strossen does not mention the case of Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser8 in her article, it is not difficult to anticipate
a civil libertarian view on restricting hate speech under this case. The
first argument would be to ask who is to determine what constitutes
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech? A second argument would probably
relate to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Bethel, in which he
stated that "the Court's holding concerns only the authority that school
officials have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language
in a speech given to a high school assembly." ' 79 A civil libertarian would

contend that this language limits the scope of Bethel to the facts, thereby
preventing the limitation of hate speech through a lewd, indecent, or
offensive language argument.
3. The Group Defamation Theory
Professor Strossen also addresses the theory of group defamation and
hate speech. She begins by agreeing with Professor Lawrence that group
defamation is not valid under Beauharnaisv. Illinois. 0 Next, she argues:
The concept of defamation encompasses only false statements of
fact that are made without a good faith belief in their truth. Therefore,
any disparaging or insulting statement would be immune from this
doctrine, unless it were factual in nature, demonstrably false in content,
and made in bad faith. Members of minority groups that are disparaged
by an allegedly libelous statement would hardly have their reputations
or psyches enhanced by a process in which the maker of the statement
sought to prove his good faith belief in its truth, and they were
required to demonstrate the absence thereof."
A final argument Professor Strossen makes is that there is a risk that
group defamation laws will allow the anti-discrimination codes to be
enforced against the groups intended to be protected. 2
4. Equal Opportunity and Brown v. Board of Education83
Professor Strossen responds to the theory that Brown is applicable to
the issue of hate speech by arguing that it is not actually applicable

77. Id.
78. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
79. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see Strossen, supra note 72, at 517.
81. Strossen, supra note 72, at 519.
82. Id. at 520. It should be noted, however, that there are instances where minorities and
minority groups have threatened to sue universities if they do not respond to increased racial violence
in schools. Siegel, supra note 3, at 1359.
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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because Brown dealt with government speech whereas hate speech comes
from individuals.8 She states that "[clivil libertarians vigorously support
the civil rights laws that make private discriminatory acts illegal, but
that is a far cry from making private speech illegal." 5 She contends that
Mari Matsuda's idea-that the government's failure to restrict private
hate speech is a state action that conveys a message of toleration of
87
such speech

6

-is unfounded because of the Equal Protection Clause.

She suggests that "[blecause the court construes the Establishment Clause
as prohibiting government action that conveys a message of state support
for religion, Establishment Clause cases constitute instructive precedence
for evaluating Professor Matsuda's argument." 88 She points out that the
Supreme Court has declared that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 8 9 She applies this reasoning to the
context of campus hate speech, concluding that "[tihere is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing racism, which the Equal
Protection Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing racism, which
the Free Speech Clause protects." 9°
Although this reasoning addresses the difference between government
speech and private speech, it does not deal with the more central issue
in Brown: an individual's right to an equal educational opportunity.
Brown prohibits the state's speech from interfering with an individual's
educational opportunity, but it does not address whether a private individual can interfere with another individual's educational opportunity.
The civil libertarians do not address the question of whether private
speech can be restricted if it interferes with another individual's right to
an equal education.
The Civil Libertarians' Theory on Campus Hate Speech
Professor Strossen states that the civil libertarians' strategy to deal
with campus hate speech is to increase speech rather than decrease itY'
She believes this to be more consistent with First Amendment principles
and more effective in advancing equality. She suggests several ways to
accomplish this. First, all government agencies, including university officials, should condemn ideas which promulgate inequality and affirmatively endorse equality principles and mutual respect. 92 Second,
B.

84. Strossen, supra note 72, at 541-42 (the government speech in the Brown case being the
permitting of segregation in school by the state).
85. Id. at 546 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
86. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2371.
87. Strossen, supra note 72, at 544-45.
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 545 (emphasis in original) (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 562.
92. Id.
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universities should encourage voluntary restraint of hate speech and provide education to promote intergroup understanding." Third, she suggests
counseling for individuals who violate the "norms of civility." 94 Fourth,
she promotes university-sponsored forums in which "controversial racerelated issues and ideas could be discussed in a candid but constructive
way."
Finally, she suggests that universities encourage students to take
classes that expose students to cultures and traditions of racial and ethnic
groups diverse from their own. 96 She points out that some schools-the
University of Minnesota, 9 Mt.
Holyoke, and Tufts University-already
7
have similar requirements.
V. THE VICTIM'S STORY
One of the problems with the civil libertarians' viewpoint is that they
forget that where there is hate speech there are victims, and that these
victims' rights must be considered when dealing with hate speech. Mari
Matsuda considers the victim's story in her 1989 Michigan Law Review
article. 98 Although her article is written with an eye toward curbing hate
speech in the general population, she does include a section on the special
problems faced by universities.
Professor Matsuda argues that to protect First Amendment values, a
narrow definition of actionable hate speech is required.9 She believes
hate speech should be treated as a sui generis category because it presents
"an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and denigration of the very classes of human beings
who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside
the realm of protected discourse."'' ° She goes on to argue that the First
Amendment will be weakened if hate speech, distinguished by three specific
characteristics, is not treated as a separate exception.' 0'
Professor Matsuda deals separately with several areas she terms "hard
cases."' 0 2 Because of the number of areas and complexities of her arguments, however, only two will be discussed here. First, there is "The
Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist."'' 0 Some social scientists make

93. Id. at 563.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 564.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 564 n.407.
98. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2320.
99. Id. at 2357.
1O0. Id.
101. Professor Matsuda proposes that:
[iun
order to distinguish the worst, pardigm example of racist hate messages from
other forms of racist and non-racist speech, three identifying characteristics are
suggested here:
(1) The messages of racial inferiority;
(2) The messages directed against a historically oppressed group; and
(3) The messages persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357-58.
102. Id. at 2361.
103. Id.at 2364.
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their case for racial inferiority in an academic setting based on "scientific
evidence." This raises two questions: (1) should a forum be permitted°4
to receive such ideas; and (2) should these expressions be restricted?'
With respect to the first question, Professor Matsuda concludes that
"[uinder the principle of academic freedom, ignorant views need not be
heard, but unpopular academically tenable views should be."'' 5 With
regard to the second question Professor Matsuda states that "[a]ssuming
the dead-wrong social-science theory of inferiority is free of any message
of hatred and persecution, the ordinary, private solution is sufficient:
attack such theories with open public debate, and with denial of a forum
if the work is unsound in its documentation."'06
Professor Matsuda deals independently with universities as one of her
"hard cases" under a specific heading.) 7 She notes that university cases
raise unique concerns because universities are charged with pedagogy and
their constituency has special vulnerabilities. 18 She goes on to state that
"[mJany of the new adults who come to live and study at the major
universities are away from home for the first time, and at a vulnerable
stage of psychological development.''1°9 The idea that universities are
special places leads Professor Matsuda to conclude that "[o]fficial tolerance of racist speech in this setting is more harmful than generalized
tolerance in the community-at-large." 0 She reaches this conclusion for
several reasons. First, she argues that students see the university as taking
sides through inaction. Second, she argues that racist speech "is a harm
to the goals of inclusion, education, development of knowledge, and
ethics that universities exist and stand for.""' Finally, Professor Matsuda
theorizes that students are a captive audience and analogous to a private
figure, thereby, increasing their need for protection." 2 Although university
students are not under compulsory school attendance laws, they have
paid for the right to attend classes, use the libraries and cafeterias, and
live on the premises. Hence, university students are a captive audience
requiring special First Amendment considerations." 3 Unlike a public fig4
ure, a student has few avenues of retreat when faced with hate speech."
When hate speech appears on campus, target groups of students experience
debilitated access to the full university experience." 5 Although Professor
Matsuda does not elaborate as to how, she argues that restrictions at
the university level should go beyond those she suggested for the general
community, while still allowing for academic discussion and inquiry.
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Even though Professor Matsuda's theory restricts hate speech in a very
narrow manner, the direct application of her theory to the university
setting may increase rather than decrease the conflict. One premise for
the increase in harassment of minorities on campuses is that non-minorities
resent what they perceive as preferential treatment of minorities." 6 The
second part of Professor Matsuda's three part principle would restrict
speech only when "[t]he message is directed against a historically oppressed
group.""17 This could lead to an increase in the type of perceptions some
non-minorities already have regarding preferential treatment of minorities,
which in turn could lead to a backlash of harassment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution protects an individual's freedom of speech. The Su8
preme Court, however, has held that this is not an absolute right.
Whether or not hate speech is a form of speech that can be restricted
under existing constitutional doctrine, or should be restricted by creating
another exception to protected speech, is a highly debated issue. Because
of the increase in the number of campus incidents involving hate speech,"19
colleges and universities have been forced to deal with the problem with
very few legal precedents to follow. This has put school administrators
in a very undesirable position. On the one hand, they are being pressured
by victims of hate speech to take action against those engaging in such
speech. 20 On the other hand, they are being criticized by civil libertarians
who insist that the restriction of hate speech, on almost any grounds,
2
is unconstitutional.1 '
122
Several schools have attempted to write or rewrite their anti-discrimination codes to conform to existing constitutional doctrine. Although
23
this is the most logical approach, it has not pacified civil libertarians
or appeased the victims of hate speech. 24 With all the contention sur-

rounding this solution, it is arguable that any attempt to base an anti-

116. See Elaine Wishner & Jonathan Levine, Ignorance and Insensitivity Can Feed Campus Bigotry,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1990, at 19 (attributing the increase in racial incidents on campuses to the

lack of knowledge of the history of bigotry in the United States); Joseph Berger, Deep Racial
Divisions Persist in New Generation at College, N.Y. TimEs, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 1 ("The
latest wave of racial incidents at dozens of American campuses reflects deep strains between black
and white students, including resentment by whites over what they see as preferential treatment of
blacks ...."); Mike McQueen, Racism Etches Ugly Scars on College Campuses, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Feb. 4, 1990, 21st story, level I (the increase of racial incidents on campuses "may reflect
a growing resentment by whites, who perceive minorities as getting special treatment.").
117. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357.
118. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
119. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying note 101.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 72-97.
122. These schools include Stanford University, the University of Michigan, the University of
Connecticut, and the University of Texas.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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125
will
discrimination code on any other existing constitutional doctrine
be met with even more resistance.
When formulating a solution to the problem of hate speech, it is
important to remember that this issue creates a controversy between two
equally important rights126-the right of equal opportunity and the right
to free speech.' 27 One of the strongest arguments for protecting racist
speech is that it "reinforces our society's commitment to the value of
tolerance ....,,128 Nevertheless, it seems unjust to ask minority groups
to bear this burden for the good of society. 29 Keeping all this in mind,
not only should school administrators address the problem of hate speech,
but they must do so in order to provide all students with an equal
educational opportunity. 30 The key is to do this within the framework
of the Constitution.
The problem of hate speech must be dealt with. Furthermore, any
solution must protect the rights of both the victims of hate speech as
well as the rights of those who choose to use such speech. Although the
Supreme Court has drawn the line between protected and unprotected
speech in the past, it has not done so with regard to hate speech.
Consequently, any restrictions on hate speech will have to be made under
existing constitutional doctrines. Contrary to Professor Strossen's asser2 is still good law and can be
tion,' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire'1
used to restrict limited forms of hate speech. Thus, any university antidiscrimination codes that are formulated under the fighting words doctrine
from Chaplinsky, subject to the later modifications made by the Court,'3 3
should be upheld as constitutional. 3 4 Nonetheless, these codes must still
be narrowly drawn so as not to chill speech and interfere with academic
discussion and research.'3 5 Notwithstanding Professor Strossen's argument

125. See supra text accompanying notes 53-71.
126. Professor Matsuda argues:
[tihe first amendment and the concept of free speech is an important one, but if
I were to give primacy to any one right, and if I were to create a hierarchy, I
would put equality first, because the right of speech is meaningless to people who
do not have equality.
Mari J. Matsuda, The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Language as Violence v. Freedom of
Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives of Group Defamation, 37 Bunr. L. REv. 337, 360
(Spring 1988/89).
127. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 434.
128. Id. at 435-36.
129. Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Good Speech Bad Speech, 24 STAN. LAWYER 6, 40 (1990).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
132. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
134. It is important to note that the Stanford code differs from the overturned University of
Michigan code in three significant respects: "First, the Stanford rule contains an intent requirement,
unlike its University of Michigan counterpart. Second, the Stanford policy applies only to comments
directly addressed to an individual or a small group. Third, the code punishes speech that meets
the constitutional standard of 'fighting words."' Siegel, supra note 3, at 1391.
135. There is evidence that a court might uphold a narrowly drawn code:
The court that decided Doe [v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989)] confined its ruling to the particular facts of the case. Rather than
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regarding Chaplinsky, her strategy of education, counseling, and cultural
awareness classes as a means of combating hate speech' 3 6 has merit and
should be supported not only by other civil libertarians, but also by
victims of hate speech. This is the only way that long-term attitude
changes towards minorities will occur.
Reginald Wilson, Minority Concerns Director with the American Council of Education in Washington, stated "jolur college campuses are a
microcosm of what's happening in our society, and from what I see on
campuses we're in a lot of trouble."'13 7 Mr. Wilson's statement emphasizes
that not only is the quality of education for minorities at stake, but the
future of our country is as well. It is deeply disturbing that these incidents
are occurring on college and university campuses, incidents involving the
future leaders not only of our government, but of industry, business,
education, and law. 3 This makes many people wonder what the future
holds for our society if an amenable solution that protects both speech
rights and victims' rights is not found.

Siegel,
136.
137.
138.

principally relying on precedents which broadly uphold free speech rights in the
academic environment, the Doe court instead chose to focus on the particular flaws
of the University of Michigan policy. By striking down the anti-discrimination rule
on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, the court resorted to a legal argument
generically used by American courts to reject constitutionally defective statutes.
Only in dicta did the court refer to the unique importance of free speech in an
institution dedicated to the exchange of ideas and the pursuit of knowledge. This
structure of the decision might signify the court's willingness to uphold a narrowly
drafted code.
supra note 3, at 1377 (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
McQueen, supra note 116.
See Foxman, supra note 5, at 20, col. 3.

